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Abstract 
 
This paper tests various hypotheses about distributive politics by studying the distribution 
of federal spending across U.S. states over the period 1978-2002. We improve on 
previous work by using survey data to measure the share of voters in each state that are 
Democrats, Republicans, and independents, or liberals, conservatives and moderates. We 
find no evidence for the “swing voter" hypothesis { that is, no significant association 
between the amount of federal funds a state receives and the fraction of independents or 
moderates in the state. We also find no evidence for the “battleground state" hypothesis - 
no significant association between the amount of federal funds and the degree of partisan 
balance in a state. Modest support is found for the \partisan supporters" hypothesis, which 
conjectures that politicians will favour areas that contain a large percentage of their core 
supporters. 
 
JEL Nos.: D72, D78, H50. 
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1. Introduction
Distributive politics is a core issue in political economy, and scholars have developed a
variety of models about how it works. In this paper we test three key hypotheses derived
from these models, using data that has not previously been applied to this problem.
The rst is the \swing voter" hypothesis, which predicts that politicians will allocate
larger shares of distributive goods to groups or geographic areas that contain larger per-
centages of indierent voters (who are indierent between the political parties on ideological
grounds). The second is the \electoral battleground" hypothesis, according to which distrib-
utive goods should be disproportionately allocated to districts, states, or provinces where
the share of supporters of each major party is closer to 50%. This hypothesis is especially
relevant in systems where two major parties compete in rst-past-the-post elections with
geographically dened constituencies. The third is the \partisan supporters" hypothesis,
which conjectures that politicians will favour areas that contain a large percentage of their
core supporters. They might do this in order to send clear signals to voters, induce higher
turnout, or avoid excessive deadweight costs.1 In all three cases, one underlying assumption
is that politicians are mainly interested in winning elections, and oer government transfers
or projects in order to appeal to voters.
Testing these hypotheses is dicult. It requires measures of government spending across
groups or geographic units of some sort (the dependent variable), as well as measures of the
underlying partisan leanings or ideological attitudes of voters in each group or geographic
unit (the key independent variables). The dependent variable is not too much of a prob-
lem, at least if one adopts the geographic approach. This is what virtually all previous
empirical studies do, using the distribution of spending across units such as districts, states,
or provinces. Measuring the key independent variables, however, poses a severe challenge.
Researchers do not have good measures of the underlying partisan leanings or ideological
attitudes of voters within each geographic unit. As a result, all but one of the previous stud-
1Other theorists emphasize factors such as proposal power (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989), legislative seniority
(McKelvey and Riezman, 1992), over- and under-representation (Ansolabehere, et al., 2003; Knight, 2006),
committee structure, presidential leadership, and universalism (Weingast et al., 1981; McCarty, 2000).
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ies use proxy variables constructed from voting data or election outcomes.2 This is clearly
problematic, however, since, by assumption, voting decisions are endogenous to the distribu-
tion of government funds. Most previous studies acknowledge this problem, and attempt to
deal with it in some way, but the solutions proposed are not convincing.
In this paper we use survey data on party identication and ideological positions, rather
than voting data, to construct measures of the key independent variables. The variables
based on survey data are almost certainly much more exogenous than variables based on
votes. In addition, we can construct a direct measure of the fraction of \swing voters" in
each geographic unit, since we have the fraction who call themselves \independents" (not
attached to either major party) and \moderates" (not liberal or conservative). The data are
for U.S. states, and the period we study is 1978-2002.
Our results are easily summarized. We nd little support for any of the three hypotheses
listed above. We nd no support for either the swing voter hypothesis or the electoral
battleground hypothesis. We nd mixed support for the partisan supporters hypothesis.
In addition, the use of survey data allows us go further than previous studies. We can
also estimate the impact that government spending in a geographic area has on the vote
{ voting decisions now as the dependent variable and the geographic distribution of funds
as an independent variable { using the survey based measures of party identication and
ideology as controls. We nd that spending has little or no eect on voters' choices.
2. Previous Literature
One of the dominant theories in political economy is the so-called \swing voter" hypoth-
esis. This posits that the allocation of distributive goods will largely go in favor of groups or
regions that contain a conspicuous share of voters that are ideologically indierent between
the political parties. While voters with a clear partisan leaning rarely switch their vote to
a dierent party, indierent voters often do. If voters trade o their ideological stances in
exchange for public funds and projects, then it is cheaper for politicians to \buy" the votes
2The one exception is Dahlberg and Johansson, (2002). This paper has other problems, however, which
we discuss below.
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of these indierent, or swing, voters, and competition for these voters will lead politicians
to allocate disproportionate amounts of federal spending to regions or groups with many
indierent voters. Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Dixit and Londregan (1995, 1996), and
Stromberg (2004) analyze models that capture this logic.
Several studies nd evidence supporting the swing voter models in some contexts, but
mixed or no evidence in other contexts. Studies of the allocation of New Deal spending
have found some evidence that states with a more volatile presidential vote received more
federal support (Wright, 1974; Wallis, 1987, 1996; Fleck, 1999; Fishback, et al., 2003).
However, Stromberg (2004) shows that these ndings are not robust to the use of panel
data methods with state xed eects. Similarly, in a more recent study on federal budget
allocation by contemporary presidents, Larcinese, et al. (2006) nd that states with more
frequent presidential vote swings do not receive more funds. All of these studies use lagged
presidential vote returns to measure the fraction of swing voters.3
The logic of distributive politics is also aected by electoral rules. In particular, winner-
takes-all systems create incentives to target constituencies that are likely to be pivotal
(Lizzeri and Persico, 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 2004). In other words, battleground
districts may be favored both in public policy and campaign resources allocation (Snyder,
1989; Stromberg, 2005). The competitiveness of elections is particularly important in the
U.S. context, where the electoral college system may induce the channelling of resources
toward states that are pivotal in the presidential electoral race.
Existing empirical studies do not nd a clear relationship between resource allocation
and competitiveness of presidential election at state level. According to Wright (1974), U.S.
states with close presidential races do not receive disproportionately more New Deal spend-
3One exception is Dahlberg and Johansson (2002), who use survey data to construct a measure of the
percentate of swing voters in each Swedish region. They nd that the distribution of environmental grants
in Sweden is concentrated most heavily in electorally pivotal regions of the country. Unlike us, who focus
on large spending aggregates, they analyse a tiny "ecological grant" program. The distribution of voters'
preferences by electoral constituency is estimated by using the Swedish Election Study of 1994: one problem
is therefore that such survey is not guaranteed to be statistically representative by constituency. Most
importantly, they use spending on 115 municipalities as dependent variable but have only 29 observations
for the distribution of voters' preferences (independent variable). This implies that the standard errors
reported in their tables are too small: the authors do not appear to have clustered by constituency.
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ing. Similarly, Larcinese, et al. (2006) nd no evidence that states with close presidential
races receive more federal monies.4. On the other hand, several studies nd that battle-
ground states receive a disproportionate share of the advertising in presidential campaigns
(Colantoni, et al., 1975; Nagler and Leighley, 1990; Stromberg, 2005). All of these studies
use lagged presidential vote returns to measure the two-party balance in each state.
A competing theory of distributive politics is that parties target spending toward loyal
voters (Kramer, 1964; Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Dasgupta, et
al., 2001; Sim, 2002). This can be a rational strategy in the context of low-turnout elections
such as those in the U.S. If spending primarily mobilizes voters { either directly as a form
of advertising or retrospective voting, or indirectly by buying the support of local elites or
groups who engage in get-out-the vote eorts { then the marginal benet to spending an
additional dollar will be highest in areas with the highest density of a party's own voters.
Credit-claiming issues may also provide incentives to target core areas. Who will attend the
ribbon-cutting ceremonies for new bridges, schools, hospitals, and libraries? In a heavily
Democratic area the politicians will almost all be Democrats, and they will leave no doubt
about which party is responsible for the locality's good fortune. In electorally marginal areas,
however, roughly half of the politicians will be Democrats and half will be Republicans, and
the impression is not likely to be so partisan or clear. Neither party may benet much in
terms of net votes (although individual politicians, running as incumbents, may benet).
It is also possible that spending targeted towards loyal voters could simply reect the
fact that politicians are, at least to some extent, policy orientated. Democratic politicians
may prefer spending on policies that tend to benet Democratic voters, and likewise for
Republicans. These alternate models are not necessarily incompatible with the swing voter
hypothesis. It may be the case, for example, that the loyalists of the out-party receive
disproportionately small shares of the public dollar, while swing areas and loyal areas do
4Milligan and Smart(2003) nds that closeness of the electoral race has a positive eect on spending in
the Atlantic Canadian provinces, but a negative eect in Quebec, while Crampton (2003) nds a positive
correlation between competitiveness of the race and spending only in Canadian provinces which are not ruled
by the liberal party
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equally well.
Empirically, several studies nd evidence that loyal voters are rewarded. Some studies
nd a positive relationship between the share of U.S. federal spending going to an area and
the Democratic vote in the area (e.g., Browning, 1973; Ritt, 1976; Owens and Wade, 1984;
Levitt and Snyder, 1995). Since Democrats were the majority party in Congress during the
years studied, this provides some support for the idea that federal spoils go to the victors, but
the results might also reect the behavior of the Democratic party or the characteristics of
areas that tend to vote Democratic.5 Some studies of U.S. states nd a positive relationship
between spending and past share vote for the incumbent president's party (Fleck, 2003;
Larcinese, et al., 2006; Garrett and Sobel, 2003).6
3. Problems with Using Voting Data to Measure Citizens' Prefer-
ences or Partisanship: A Simulation
As noted above, almost all of the existing empirical literature uses voting data to measure
the percentage of swing voters, partisan balance, or the partisan disposition of each state.
One powerful critique of these measures is that voting behavior is endogenous. Most
papers tend to use lagged values of the vote to mitigate the problem somewhat, but this is
at best a partial solution for at least two reasons: (i) budgetary processes are sluggish, and
spending in any given year depends to a large extent on decisions made in previous years, and
(ii) we do not know if voters are \retrospective" or \prospective." If voters are somewhat
prospective and parties keep their promises { as assumed in many models of distributive
electoral politics { then lagged votes are a function of lagged promises which are equal to
(or at least highly correlated with) current spending. There is a third reason to suspect
that lagged vote measures are not exogenous: (iii) omitted variables that are correlated both
5Levitt and Snyder (1995) compare programs passed during years of unied Democratic control with
programs passed during years of divided government. They nd that programs passed during unied De-
mocratic control exhibit a pro-Democratic geographic bias, while those passed during divided government
do not. Levitt and Poterba (1999) also nd indirect evidence that the majority party favors its core areas:
areas represented by more senior Democrats tend to get more.
6Studies of the distribution of patronage by urban machines also nd that the organizations in control
of their cities tend to reward their core supporters with patronage (Holden, 1973; Rakove, 1975; Erie, 1978;
Johnston, 1979).
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with voting and budgetary decisions. For example, some groups might be especially favored
in distributive policies because they are associated with \good values" that citizens wish to
preserve (e.g., farmers), and these groups might vote in particular ways (e.g., they might
favor conservative parties).
Since the measures used by the current literature to test concurrent theories of distributive
politics are clearly endogenous under a variety of assumptions, regression estimates that use
them are typically biased. The sign and magnitude of the bias, however, are more dicult
to determine. In the simplest cases we can compute the expected bias analytically, but most
regressions that appear in the literature are fairly complicated, and typically include two
or more vote-based measures in the same model. We therefore ran a series of simulated
regressions. These allow us to gauge the sign and size of the bias in a set of models that are
similar to many of the standard models in the literature.
The simulations show that the endogeneity of voting data can lead to severely biased
estimates. More specically, using the standard deviation of observed votes rather than the
true number of independents can lead either to overestimation or underestimation of the
impact of the number of independents on the allocation of federal spending, depending on
the specication and the set of variables included in the regression. The eect of an electoral
competition is often underestimated but sometimes also overestimated. Finally, using the
observed votes to measure the partisanship of a region leads to systematic overestimation of
the impact of the number of partisan voters on spending.
We consider the following basic structure. Let j = 1; :::; J index states, and let t = 1; :::; T
index years. Assume all states have the same population. Let Dj be the fraction of voters
in state j who are loyal to party D, let Rj be the fraction who are loyal to party R, and let
Ij be the fraction who are independents (swing voters). Also, let ~Dj = Dj=(Dj+Rj) be the
fraction of all loyalists who are loyal to party D, and let ~Rj = Rj=(Dj+Rj) = 1  ~Dj. Let
~Cj = 1  j ~Dj  ~Rjj be the two-party \competitiveness," or partisan balance, of state j. Let
XDjt be the per-capita transfers that party D oers to state j and year t, and let X
R
jt be the
oer made by party R. Let SDjt be the \electoral support" party D receives in state j in year
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t, and let SRjt be the support received by party R. Finally, let
~V Djt be the fraction of votes
party D receives in state j in year t, and let ~V Rjt = 1  ~V Djt . We assume:
XDjt = IIj + C ~Cj + P ~Dj + 
D
jt (1)
XRjt = IIj + C ~Cj + P ~Rj + 
R
jt (2)
SDjt = IX
D
jt Ij + (1+PX
D
jt )Dj + 
D
jt (3)
SRjt = IX
R
jtIj + (1+PX
R
jt)Rj + 
R
jt (4)
~V Djt = S
D
jt=(S
D
jt + S
R
jt) (5)
If I > 0, I > 0 and C = P = P = 0 then we have a linearized approximation of the
\swing voter" model of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1995, 1996).
If P > 0, P > 0, I  0, I  0, and C = 0 then we have something like the \machine
politics" model of Dixit and Londregran (1996) or the model of Cox and McCubbins (1986),
or what Fishbeck, et al. (2003) call the mandate model. Finally, if C > 0, I  0, I  0,
P  0, and P = 0, then we have something approximating the model of Milligan and
Smart (2005), or the electoral college model of Colantoni, et al., (1975), Stromberg (2002)
and others.7
If researchers had direct measures of Ij, Dj and Rj, then they could construct ~Cj, ~Dj
and ~Rj, and then directly estimate equations (1) and (2). In almost all cases, however,
they do not. Instead, they use measures based on the actual vote shares, ~V D. Beginning
with Wright (1974), researchers have often used the standard deviation of ~V D over a set
of elections within each state j as a proxy for Ij. Intuitively, if Ij is large then ~V
D will
vary widely across elections in state j, and the standard deviation of ~V D in state j will be
large.8 Researchers also tend to use some historical average of ~V D as a proxy for ~Dj, and an
analogous average as a proxy for ~Rj. Finally, researchers usually use some historical average
of  j ~V D  ~V Rj as a proxy for ~Cj.
7This formulation does not do justice to some of these models, such as Stromberg (2002), which takes
into account the total probability a state is \pivotal" in the electoral college.
8Trending partisanship could also produce a large standard deviation of ~V D, which is a potential problem.
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As noted above, there are many reasons why even historical voting measures are not
exogenous: (i) budgetary lags; (ii) voters could be \prospective" and (iii) there are probably
omitted variables that are correlated both with voting patterns and budgetary decisions.
Rather than constructing complicated historical averages and autocorrelation structures that
attempt to incorporate these features more precisely, we simply use contemporaneous voting
data freely in our simulated regressions. Let V Dj = (1=T )
PT
t=1
~V Djt be the mean of V
D in
state j over a sample of T years, and let I^j = [(1=T )
PT
t=1( ~V
D
jt   V Dj )2]1=2 be the sample
standard deviation. Also, let C^jt = 1  j ~V Djt   ~V Rjt j be the closeness of the election in state j
in year t.
We consider the following specications:
Model 1a : XDjt = aI I^j + jt
Model 1b : XDjt = aCC^jt + jt
Model 1c : XDjt = aP ~V
D
jt + jt
Model 2a : XDjt = aI I^j + aCC^jt + jt
Model 2b : XDjt = aI I^j + aP ~V
D
jt + jt
Model 2c : XDjt = aCC^jt + aP
~V Djt + jt
Model 3 : XDjt = aI I^j + aCC^jt + aP
~V Djt + jt
Model 4 : XDjt = aIIj + aCC^jt + aP ~V
D
jt + jt
We only analyze party D, since analogous specications for party R would simply duplicate
the results. Note that in Model 4 we use the actual value of Ij rather than the vote-based
measure. This approximates the \encompassing models" in Dahlberg and Johansson (2002),
which include a survey-based measure of I, but vote-based measure of VD.
In each simulation, we set J=50 and T =100, i.e. 50 states over 100 years. Note that this
gives much more data on the time dimension than researchers actually have. We do this to
focus attention more on the bias produced by endogeneity than on measurement error bias
(which also plagues the literature). In all cases, I, D, and R, are drawn from independent
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uniform distributions on [0; 1]. Also, in each simulation, I, D, and R are xed for all 100
years (i.e., all t = 1; :::; 100). Next, we choose values for the parameters I , C , P , I , and
C . Finally, we draw 
D, R, D and R from independent uniform distributions. We set the
standard deviations of D and R to , and the standard deviations of 
D and R to .
We focus on four dierent cases. In Case 1 and Case 2 there is no partisan targeting,
that is, P = 0. In addition, we assume there is no partisan voter response to transfers,
that is, P = 0. The dierence between the two cases is the value of , the degree to which
the distribution of transfers across states is determined by random, idiosyncratic factors. In
Case 1,  = :2, so the idiosyncratic factors are relatively important. In Case 2,  = :03,
so the idiosyncratic factors are less important. In Case 3 and Case 4 there is partisan
targeting, with P = :5. We also assume there is a partisan voter response, with P = :5.
The dierence between the two cases is again the value of , with  = :2 in Case 3 and
 = :03 in Case 4. Inside each case, we vary the parameters I and C . We x I = 1 and
 = :09 throughout the simulations.
For each vector of parameters we run 10,000 simulated regressions. Table 1 presents the
averages of the estimates of the parameters of interest9. To give an example, if we take model
2a, the rst row gives the average estimates of, respectively, I (.01) and C (.08) when the
true values of these parameters are both set equal to 0: the columns on the left of Table 1
report the true values in each case. We observe a number of patterns.
First, in most cases the average estimates of aP are biased upward. That is, there is a
strong tendency to nd \partisan targeting" predicted by the mandate model or machine
politics model, even when it does not exist. The eect is large when idiosyncratic factors
have a large impact on transfers. This is a direct result of the assumption that independent
voters respond to transfers in their voting behavior. When one party happens to spend more
than the other party in a state { whether due to the exogenous factors captured in D and
R, or to actual partisan targeting { then many independent voters will vote for that party,
9Rather than reporting all possible specications, we focus on bI and bC in cases 1 and 2, and on bP in
cases 3 and 4. However, we always report the results for the case where all variables are included.
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producing a spurious additional correlation between transfers and votes.
Second, the average estimates of aI tend to be biased downward, but are sometimes
biased upward. They can even have the wrong sign: this appears to be especially the case
when  is low and aI is high. The average estimates of aI are not even monotonic in the
true value of I , as we can see in the models 2b and 3 of case 3.
Also, the average estimates of aI are often biased even when the true Ij are used (model
4): this is because the other vote-based measures are endogenous and may be correlated
with Ij. In fact, the bias on aI can be even larger using the true Ij: this is especially the
case when the true Ij is low.
Third, the average estimates of aC are sometimes biased downward and sometimes biased
upward. When  is low the coecient is generally underestimated, while if  is high then
the coecient can be biased both upwards and downwards depending on the specication.
The diculty in recovering the true parameters is well illustrated if we consider model
3, which is similar to many specications used in the empirical literature. Here when  is
high (cases 1 and 3) the estimate of P is systematically and substantially upward biased.
If instead  is low (cases 2 and 4), then we obtain a much more precise estimate of P :
This comes at the cost, however, of a deterioration in the estimates of I . In fact, there
appears to be a trade-o between the consistency of bP and the consistency of bI . The
intuition is straightforward. As noted above, a large degree of random variation in the
allocation of spending induces more support to be directed at parties simply by voters'
reaction to the spending. Many independents therefore act as if they are partisans, generating
a spurious positive correlation between observed votes and observed spending. At the same
time, however, a more random allocation of funds facilitates the identication of the electoral
response to spending. Since independent voters respond to spending, random variation in the
allocation of funds will produce large uctuations in their voting behavior. The standard
deviation of the vote is then a relatively good measure of the proportion of independent
voters. In fact, this means that we encounter a type of contradiction: the swing voter
hypothesis is testable (using voting data) only insofar as it is false, i.e. only insofar as funds
10
are randomly allocated rather than targeted to independent voters.
4. The Data
We analyze U.S. federal budget allocation to the states during the period from 1978 to
2002 to test the various hypothesis about distributive politics. We consider three dependent
variables: (1) total federal spending per-capita, (2) total spending other than direct transfers
to individuals, per-capita, and (3) federal grants per-capita. The second variable should allow
us to isolate the most manipulable items in the budget, since it removes the largest of the
\non-discretionary" or \entitlement" programs, such as Social Security, Medicare, pensions
for public ocials, AFDC (TANF), etc.10 The third variable is arguably the most targetable;
and while it is much smaller than (1) or (2) it still constitutes an important part of state
nances. In all cases, our dependent variables are outlays.
It is important to consider that there is a lag between the appropriation and the spending
of federal funds. This is relevant when estimating the eect of particular institutional and
political variables, since current federal outlays have normally been appropriated in previ-
ous calendar years. For this reason, we will always consider lagged values of the political
explanatory variables.
As noted above, one of the main independent variable of interest is the percentage of
swing voters in a state. We use survey data to measure the share of \independents" (and
also the share of Democratics and Republicans). These data are from exit polls conducted
by various news organizations { CBS News, CBS News/New York Times, ABC News, ABC
News/Washington Post, and Voter News Service.11 Voters are interviewed briey after
leaving the polling booth, and asked how they voted. They are also asked to provide their
party identication (Democrat, Republican, other, or independent), and their ideological
leaning (liberal, conservative, moderate, or don't know).12 Importantly, these questions are
10Interest on the debt is not included in either dependent variable.
11Voter News Service is an association of ABC News, CNN, CBS News, FOX News, NBC News and the
Associated Press.
12In addition, voters are asked a series of questions about their demographic and socio-economic charac-
teristics, questions about the reasons for their vote choice, and, sometimes, questions about salient policy
issues.
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designed to tap into voters' general self-identication, rather than how the voters have just
voted. Two typical forms of the party identication question are: \Regardless of how you
voted today, do you normally think of yourself as a [Democrat], [Republican], [Independent],
[Something Else]?"; and \Do you normally think of yourself as a [Democrat], [Republican],
[Independent]?" Two common forms of the ideology question are: \On most political matters,
do you consider yourself [liberal], [moderate], [conservative]?"; and \Regardless of the party
you may favor, do you lean more toward the liberal side or the conservative side politically
[liberal], [conservative], [somewhere in between]?"
Using this information we can construct state-level variables reporting the percentage of
voters that declare themselves Democratic, Republican or Independent. Due to the relatively
small number of interviewed in some states in some years, we aggregate the results over four-
year periods (two elections).
One concern is how well these data can capture the distribution of partisanship within
states. This issue is discussed extensively in Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993), who con-
clude that the partisanship measures derived from the surveys correlate in the expected way
with observable other criteria like other polls, election returns and party registration. A
number of checks induce us to think that these data capture the underlying distribution of
partisanship by state quite well and that they are preferable to using simple voting results.
Figure 1 plots the share of Democratic vote by state (averaged across all years) on the share
of Democratic partisans in the survey data. Figure 2 does the same for Republicans. There
is clear positive correlation between votes and partisanship, especially for the Republican
party. Although our purpose is to go beyond what can be captured by voting data, the
correlation between the exit poll measures and observed votes is reassuring and suggests
that our measure can be taken as a reliable indicator of partisanship. Of course, actual votes
also include non-partisans and nal election results are crucially aected by the leaning, in a
particular election, of independent voters. Hence, gure 3 reports the aggregate Democratic
share of votes at presidential elections and the share of Democratic supporters from exit
polls: it clearly shows that partisanship is much more stable of what electoral results would
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suggest and that using voting to measure partisanship can therefore be problematic13. In
Fig. 4 we report the standard deviation (over the period we consider) of presidential Demo-
cratic votes by state and compare with the standard deviation of party identication: again,
this gure suggests that partisanship is much less volatile than voting.
One key prediction of the swing voter hypothesis is that states that have more Inde-
pendents should receive more federal funds. The alternative theories of distributive politics
conjecture that the competitiveness of elections and the share of loyal voters may also af-
fect the distribution of federal funds to the states. Thus, we will test these predictions by
using measures of the share of independents, of electoral closeness and of loyal voters that,
dierently from previous work, are not based on actual voting data but on survey data.
Indicating with Dem, Rep, and Ind, respectively the share of Democrats, Republicans and
Independents, we use Ind to measure the share of independents and (1   jDem Repj) to
measure closeness.
We tried other measures of partisan and independent voters as well. Some voters may
be \cross-pressured," in the sense that they identify themselves with a party that is not the
closest on the ideological dimension. This is the case for liberal Republicans (not uncommon
in the northeast) and conservative Democrats (still common in the south and west). Such
voters are probably more prone to defect in any given election. Thus, we considered an
alternative measure of independent voters, in which cross-pressured voters are included with
the self-identied independents. In this specication, partisan Democratic voters will there-
fore only be either liberal or moderate, while Republicans will only be either conservative or
moderate. The substantive conclusions do not change when we use these variables, so we do
not report the results14.
As discussed in the introduction, swing voter models predict that states with higher
partisan and/or ideological balance should receive less funds, while the opposite is predicted
by models that stress the importance of loyal voters. If legislators reward their supporters,
13Consistently with Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002), partisanship also appears rather stable over
time or smoothly changing in some states.
14Results are available from the authors upon request.
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we should observe that incumbents divert money toward states with high shares of voters
ideologically leaning toward the incumbent legislator. In the U.S. institutional setting the
incumbent is never a unitary actor since federal budget allocation involves both Congress
and the president. Therefore, we construct dierent measures of partisanship by interacting
the party aliation of various actors with the shares of voters that declare to have the same
party aliation of the actor under consideration. To evaluate whether the president favors
his supporters we use the variable Presidential Copartisans, which is equal to the share of
Democratic voters when the incumbent president is a Democrat and the share of Republican
voters when the president is Republican.15
In addition to political considerations, a variety of demographic factors might directly
aect federal spending. Thus, in all regressions we include per-capita income, percent elderly,
percent in schooling age and total state population.16 Moreover, it is clear that the two states
bordering the District of Columbia { Maryland and Virginia { receive more funds simply
because of the spill over of federal government activities. A similar case can be made for
New Mexico because of the long term investments in military spending. Thus, in the cross
section regressions we always include dummy variables for these three states.
The sources for all variables used in our analysis are reported in Table 4.
5. Results
The simulation exercise shows that regressions based on voting data can be substantially
biased. By using arguably more exogenous measures based on exit polls, we should be able
to obtain less biased estimates. It is therefore important to compare the results in the two
cases to verify wether we obtain dierent estimates. We can then use the simulation exercise
15We constructed analogous variables using the party aliation of the majority in the house (House
Majority Copartisans) and senate (Senate Majority Copartisans) as well as the political aliation of state
senators (Senator Copartisans). The results are substantively the same as those obtained in the case of
president aliation. We do not report them here but they are available from the authors upon request.
16The total population size captures the eects of malapportionment of the U.S. Senate, as small states
are extemely over-represented. It may, however, also capture budgetary lags. Because of \incremental
budgeting," the growth of the population is likely to negatively aect the levels of expenditure per capita. If
there are lags in adjusting the allocation of transfers to population shifts, then, as a state population grows
its per-capita transfers will automatically fall. Economies of scale might also lead to a negative eect of
population on per-capita transfers.
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as a benchmark to evaluate the potential bias in estimated coecients.
The key test of the swing voter model is whether the coecients on the share of indepen-
dents is positive. We compare, therefore, the results obtained when the share of independents
from the exit polls is used as explanatory variable with the results obtained when observed
votes are used. In this case we use the standard deviation of Democratic vote in the previ-
ous three presidential elections. The \battleground state" hypothesis stresses the role of the
state marginality: thus, we also estimate regressions with closeness as explanatory variable
for spending. Results when the competitiveness of electoral races is measured using exit
polls can then be compared with regressions when closeness is measured by using voting
data. Finally, we test the alternative possibility that loyal voters get more funds. Again, we
compare results when the share of votes for the incumbent president is used as explanatory
variable with results when exit polls partisan measures are used instead.
To check the robustness of our results we consider several possible variants of these basic
models. We consider specications in which swing, pivotality and partisan measures are
used in the same regression. This should avoid the possibility that the obvious correlations
between those measures could bias the estimate of single coecients, since, as discussed, the
various hypotheses are not necessarily incompatible with each other. We also consider the
possibility that the share of swing voters and the closeness could have a positive interaction.
Unfortunately the two variables are highly correlated and there appears to be little to learn
from such exercise. The results always display insignicant coecients for the interaction
term and are not reported. There is also the possibility that open primaries induce more
people to dene themselves independent. We indentify Massachusetts and Rhode Island as
two states where this is a serious possibility. Therefore all regressions have been repeated by
excluding those two states. We noticed very limited variations in the results (not reported)17.
Using yearly data when voting data are not available for each year (and the closest
past election is therefore imputed to subsequent years) can generate autocorrelation in the
residuals with the potential problems this generates for standard errors estimates. Hence, in
17Results are available from the authors upon request.
15
addition to using state-level clustered standard errors, we also run term-based regressions,
in which each presidential term is collapsed into one observation and the spending and other
control variables are averaged over the period.
Finally, we study three alternative dependent variables. In one specication we use
targetable spending, i.e. we remove from total federal expenditure the least manipulable
categories such as entitlements. In another specication we use federal grants rather than
total spending. Grants contain a larger share of discretionary spending and also often provide
the state government with some discretion over the way money is spent. Thus, receiving
more grants should be favorably regarded both by the citizens and by the administrators of
a given state.
Since we consider a large number of specications, we only report the coecients of our
variables of interest in the main text.18 These are reported in Table 2. We should point out
that for the standard control variables, we do not nd any signicant surprises or noticeable
dierences across the various specications. The percentage of aged has a positive and
signicant eect on total federal outlays, while the percentage of school-age children has
a negative signicant impact. The coecient of population (in logarithm) is negative and
signicant in most specications, while the coecient of income per capita is negative and
signicant only when xed eects are introduced.
5.1 Share of swing voters
The key test of the swing voter hypothesis consists in verifying whether the coecients
on the share of independents in a spending equation is positive. Looking at Table 2, this test
is reported in model 1 (with exit poll measures) and model 2 (with voting measures) and
then again in model 7 (when other political variables from exit polls are also introduced) and
model 8 (other political variables from voting data are introduced). We nd no evidence that
states with a larger share of independent voters receive more funds. This result is robust
across various specications, i.e. whether we use yearly or term data, whether we include or
18Detailed results are shown in the appendix.
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not state xed eects and whether we use federal expenditure, targetable spending or grants
as our dependent variable.
The situation is slightly dierent when we use the standard deviation of past vote. In
this case, the coecient is insignicant in cross section regressions but it becomes negative
and signicant in regressions with total federal spending (and, in one case, with targetable
spending) when state xed eects are included. This is the opposite of what the swing voter
model would predict: a higher share of swing voters (measured by the standard deviation of
Democratic vote) induces less spending. However, this is also consistent with our simulations,
where we found that the coecient of the share of independent voters tend to be biased
downward when voting data are used and can even assume a negative sign while the true
parameter is positive. This result is particularly evident when we compare model 7 and 8,
i.e. when we also consider closeness and partisan alignment within the same specication.
A negative sign for  in model 8 (when voting data are used) is much more common (and
signicant, in some cases) than a negative sign for  in model 7 (when exit poll data are
used).
Hence, we do not nd support for the basic prediction of the swing voter model. States
with more independent voters do not receive more federal funds. Also, while based on
the regressions with voting data one might be tempted to conclude that states with more
independents may actually be penalized, we can in fact conclude, also on the basis of our
simulation exercise, that the negative sign is most likely due to endogeneity problems.
5.2 Battleground states
We conduct a similar investigation focussing on the \competitiveness" of the electoral
race for presidential elections. This time the results using poll data (model 3) and voting
data (model 4) are quite similar. The coecient for a close race is negative, i.e. states
with closer races receive less funds. This runs against the predictions of models based on
the swing voter logic. This result, however, only holds in cross section analysis and is not
robust to the introduction of state xed eects in the case of total and targetable spending,
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although in this last case the coecients are not signicant. The situation is reversed when
we consider grants: now the negative sign prevails when state xed eects are introduced
but vanishes in cross section analysis. The magnitude of the negative eect of closeness is
larger when we use poll data measures (with the exception of grants regressions). There is
one important dierence between the voting and the exit poll regressions: in the rst case,
the results are not robust to the introduction of other political variables (model 8), while
the results in model 7 (poll data) are surprisingly similar to those of model 3. A prevalence
of the negative sign remains when we remove the cross-pressured voters from the bulk of the
partisans (not reported).
The main conclusion that we derive is that, when signicant, the coecient displays a
sign which is opposite to what the \battleground states" hypothesis would predict. Using
voting data delivers a very incoherent set of results, and this again conforms to the variability
that we found in the simulation exercise. However, using the poll data does not seem to
make any substantial dierence in this case, although the results appear more robust to
specication variations, at least in term of the signicance of the coecients.
5.3 Partisan supporters
An alternative to the swing voter hypothesis is that politicians reward loyal voters. We
consider this possibility from the presidential point of view since this is most common in the
literature. Thus, we rst consider the share of vote for the incumbent president's party as the
relevant measure of state partisanship and use it as an explanatory variable of spending. On
the other side, from the exit polls we know the share of voters who identify themselves with
each party and can therefore use this variable to measure partisanship. These alternative
measures are considered in models 5 and 6. Looking at Table 2, it is clear that this is the only
hypothesis that even receives partial support from the data. It is also clear, however, that
using voting data to measure partisanship (model 6) leads to a signicant overestimation of
this eect. This is consistent with the ndings of our simulation exercise. In model 6, the
partisan share coecient is always positive and, in some cases, signicant at the 5% level. In
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model 5 the only signicant coecients are again positive; this time, however, some negative
coecients occur and the magnitude of the eect is generally (although not always) smaller.
Introducing other political variables (model 7 and 8) induces some changes in magnitudes
and signicances. In this case the polling data measure of partisanship is always positive
and, in four cases, signicant at the 10% level. Detracting cross-pressured voters from the
count of the partisans do not alter in any signicant way these results. We conclude that
this is the only hypothesis for which we nd signicant coecients with the correct sign and
never a signicant coecient with the wrong sign, just the opposite of what we found in the
previous cases.
6. Eects of Government Expenditures on Subsequent Voting
Our previous results cast some doubt on the idea that voters are responsive to the receipt
of federal funds. In fact, one of the premises of the swing voter model is that politicians
can buy votes by favouring certain groups in terms of spending allocation: swing voters are
then simply cheaper to buy, given their lack of unconditional attachment to a given party.
Hence, in this section we turn to the other side of the coin, and ask whether voters do in fact
respond to favorable spending by rewarding incumbent politicians. By using individual exit
poll data we can run regressions of individual voting decisions conditional on funds received
and controlling for partisanship and ideological leaning. Including such controls means that,
to a large extent, we mitigate possible endogeneity problems for the spending variable.
We analyze voting decisions in presidential, gubernatorial, senate and house elections. In
the rst three cases, the swing voter model would posit that incumbents are rewarded for
the receipts of federal funds and therefore the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if
the voter chooses the incumbent (or a candidate from the incumbent's party). In the case
of the House we cannot predict how funds (which are measured at the state level) should
aect voting for particular incumbents, given that within a state there are simultaneously
many House representatives, usually from both parties. Moreover, we only know the state of
each voter, not her district. Thus, in this case the dependent variable is a dummy equal to
1 if a vote is cast for a Democratic candidate, and the explanatory variable of interest is an
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interaction term between the amounts received and the share of Democratic representatives
from the state19.
Table 2 reports our estimations when total federal expenditure in the state is used as
explanatory variable. It is clear that the fact that a state receives more federal funds does not
induce its citizens to cast more votes in favour of incumbents. The coecient of total federal
expenditure can be even negative and never reaches a 5% signicance level, in spite of the
very large number of observations. On the contrary, partisanship and ideology have massive
eects. The results when we use targetable spending do not show substantial variations, with
the exception of a positive coecient on the probability of voting for an incumbent governor.
Even in this case, however, the signicance level (10%) appears rather weak for a sample
of this size. For presidential election we encounter again a negative coecient although
only signicant at the 10% level. Grants are totally insignicant in the president, governor
and senator equations. They appear instead to have a positive impact in the probability of
voting for a Democrat in Congress when the majority of state representatives in Congress
is Democrat. This is the only coecient we encounter which turns out to be signicant at
the 5% level. Although this could be the consequence of the specication we use (not being
able to identify the district of the voters), this is also consistent with analogous ndings by
Levitt and Snyder (1995)20.
Overall, the evidence that receiving more federal funds induces voters to reward incum-
bent politicians is rather weak. One possible objection to this conclusion is that, according to
swing voter models, in equilibrium, both candidates converge on the same platform: hence,
in equilibrium, we should expect no eect, but this does not imply that voters would not re-
19Before moving into the regression analysis we have checked how well self-reported individual data could
predict actual state-level electoral results. This is a potential problem for any survey-based analysis of voting
decisions. We nd a correlation coecient of 0.792 between the results predicted by the exit poll data and
actual electoral results.
20The estimates reported in Table 3 assume that all voters should be aected in the same way by the
receipt of federal funds. This is not necessarily the case. Hence, we have considered specications that
introduce interactions between the spending variables and the partisanship and ideological variables. The
results suggest that heterogeneous responses are sometimes possible but that, overall, these eects are hardly
statistically signicant, particularly considering the size of the sample. Detailed results are reported in the
appendix.
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act to spending proposals. The idea that electoral competition brings platform convergence
appears, in reality, to run against historical evidence. The two major American parties have
often proposed very dierent platforms on spending as well as on other matters.21 Although
identifying causal relationships is not straightforward, there appears to be a clear correlation
between the platform proposals and the implemented policies, which is consistent with the
\mandate" model (Budge and Hoerbert, 1990; King and Laver 1993). At the district level
the situation does not appear much dierent: individual candidates for the House have also
been shown to systematically assume divergent positions (Erikson and Wright, 1997; An-
solabehere, et al., 2001). Hence, we conclude that our ndings, rather than the consequence
of platform convergence, constitute evidence against the idea that voters respond with their
votes to public spending in a clear and systematic way.
7. Conclusion
Our ndings regarding the allocation of federal spending across U.S. states are disap-
pointing. We nd no support for the notion that parties target areas with high numbers of
swing voters. We also nd no support for the notion that parties target battleground states.
We nd limited and mixed support for the notion that parties target areas with high num-
bers of their partisan supporters. Since we nd no signicant eect of distributive spending
on voting decisions, it seems most likely that to the extent that partisan targeting occurs it
is driven more by the policy-motivations of politicians than by strategic calculations to win
electoral support.
Our ndings might reect features of distributive politics that are particular to the U.S..
Congress is one of the most powerful and decentalized national legislatures in the world. It
jealously guards its control over the public purse. Committees are powerful, and jealously
guard their own jurisdictions. Strong norms of seniority rule give committee leaders and
members a substantial degree of independence from party leaders. Individual senators and
21See, for example, Sundquist (1983). The dierent stances on the role of public spending to stimulate
the economy taken by the Democrats and the Republicans during the great depression constitute a prime
example of policy platform divergence on spending issues, and one that has had long lasting consequences
on the subsequent evolution of the two parties.
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representatives frequently pursue their own re-election goals, working to \bring home the
bacon" for their state or district. The federal structure of the U.S., with strong and au-
tonomous state governments, further complicates the situation. For example, many federal
grants to states are either matching or project grants, and decisions by state governments
therefore aect where federal money ows. As a result, the president may have relatively lit-
tle inuence over the geographic distribution of federal expenditures. Perhaps, even though
he would like to target swing states or swing voters, he cannot.
On the other hand, our ndings might reect a broader truth about distributive politics:
it is probably messy everywhere. Further investigations in other institutional settings are
necessary to establish the validity of this conclusion.
22
REFERENCES
Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart, III. 2001. \Candidate
Positioning in U.S. House Elections." American Journal of Political Science 45: 136-
159.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Michael M. Ting. 2003. \Bargaining in
Bicameral Legislatures: When and Why Does Malapportionment Matter?" American
Political Science Review 97: 471-481.
Atlas, Cary M., Thomas W. Gilligan, Robert J. Hendershott, and Mark A. Zupan. 1995.
\Slicing the Federal Net Spending Pie: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why." American
Economic Review 85: 624-629.
Baron, David P., and John Ferejohn. 1989. \Bargaining in Legislatures." American
Political Science Review 83: 1181-1206.
Browning, Clyde E. 1973. \The Geography of Federal Outlays." Studies in Geography No.
4. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Department of Geography.
Budge, Ian, and Richard I. Hoerbert. 1990. \Mandates and Policy Outputs: U.S. Party
Platforms and Federal Expenditures." American Political Science Review 84: 111-131.
Case, Anne. 2001. \Election Goals and Income Redistribution: Recent Evidence from
Albania." European Economic Review 45: 405-423.
Colantoni, Claude S., Terrence J. Levesque, and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1975. \Campaign
Resource Allocation Under the Electoral College." American Political Science Review
69: 41-161.
Cox, Gary W. and Matthew D. McCubbins, 1986. \Electoral politics as a Redistributive
Game." Journal of Politics 48: 370-389.
Crampton, Eric. 2004. \Distributive Politics in a Strong Party System: Evidence from
Canadian Job Grant Programs." Discussion Paper, University of Canterbury.
Dahlberg, Matz, and Eva Johansson. 2002. \On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incum-
bent Governments." American Political Science Review 96: 27-40.
Dasgupta, Sugato, Amrita Dhillon, and Bhaskar Dutta. 2001. \Electoral Goals and Centre-
State Transfers: A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evidence from India." Unpub-
lished manuscript, xxx University.
Dixit, Avinash, and John Londregan. 1995. \Redistributive Politics and Economic E-
ciency." American Political Science Review 89: 856-866.
Dixit, Avinash, and John Londregan. 1996. \The Determinants of Success of Special
Interests in Redistributive Politics." Journal of Politics 58: 1132-1155.
Erie, Stephen P. 1978. \Politics, the Public Sector, and Irish Social Mobility: San Francisco,
1870-1900." Western Political Quarterly 31: 274-289.
Erikson, Robert S., Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver. 1989. \Political Parties, Public
Opinion, and State Policy in the United States." American Political Science Review
83: 729-749.
Erikson, Robert S., Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver. 1993. Statehouse Democracy:
Public Opinion and Policy in the American States. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
23
Erikson, Robert S. and Gerald C. Wright. 1997. \Voters, Candidates, and Issues in
Congressional Elections." In Congress Reconsidered, 6th edition, edited by Lawrence
C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press.
Fishback, Price V., Shawn Kantor, and John J. Wallis. 2003. \Can the New Deal Three-R's
be Rehabilitated? A County-by-County, Program-by-Program Analysis." Explorations
in Economic History 40 (July): 278-307.
Fleck, Robert K. 1999. \Electoral Incentives, Public Policy, and the New Deal Realign-
ment." Southern Economic Journal 65: 377-404.
Garrett, Thomas A., and Russel S. Sobel. 2003. \The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster
Payments," Economic Inquiry 46(3 July): 496-509.
Green, Donald, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler. 2002. Partisan Hearts and Minds.
Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Holden, Matthew. 1973. White Man's Burden. New York: Chandler.
Horiuchi, Yusaku, and Jun Saito. 2001. \Electoral Reform and the Distribution of Public
Expenditures: Evidence from Japan." Unpublished manuscript, National University
of Singapore.
ICPSR. 1995. General Election Data for the United States, 1950-1990 [Computer le].
ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Re-
search [producer and distributor].
Johnston, Michael. 1979. \Patrons and Clients, Jobs and Machines: A Case Study of the
Uses of Patronage." American Political Science Review 73: 385-398.
King, Gary and Michael Laver. 1993. \On Party Platforms, Mandates, and Government
Spending." American Political Science Review, 87 (September): 744-750.
Knight, Brian G. 2006. \Estimating the Value of Proposal Power". American Economic
Review, forthcoming.
Kramer, Gerald H. \A Decision-Theoretic Analysis of a Problem in Political Campaigning."
In Mathematical Applications in Political Science, volume 11, edited by Joseph L.
Bernd. Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University.
Larcinese, Valentino, Leonzio Rizzo, and Cecilia Testa. 2006. \Allocating the US Federal
Budget to the States: the Impact of the President." Journal of Politics, 68 (May):
447-456.
Levitt, Steven D., and James M. Poterba. 1999. \Congressional Distributive Politics and
State Economic Performance." Public Choice 99: 185-216.
Levitt, Stephen D., and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1995. \Political Parties and the Distribution
of Federal Outlays." American Journal of Political Science 39: 958-980.
Lindbeck, Assar, and Jorgen W. Weibull. 1987. \Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the
Outcome of Political Competition." Public Choice 52: 273-297.
Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico. 2001. \The Provision of Public Goods under
Alternative Electoral Incentives." American Economic Review. 91: 225-239.
McCarty, Nolan M. 2000. \Presidential Pork: Executive Veto Power and Distributive
Politics." American Political Science Review 94: 117-129.
24
McKelvey, Richard D., and Raymond Riezman. 1992. \Seniority in Legislatures." Ameri-
can Political Science Review 86: 951-965.
Milligan, Kevin, and Michael Smart 2003. \Regionalism and pork barrel politics." Unpub-
lished manuscript, University of Toronto.
Milligan, Kevin, and Michael Smart. 2005. \Regional Grants as Pork Barrel Politics."
Unpublished manuscript, University of Toronto.
Nagler, Jonathan, and Jan Leighley. 1992. \Presidential Campaign Expenditures: Evi-
dence on Allocations and Eects." Public Choice. 73(3)-April.310-333.
Owens, John R., and Larry L. Wade. 1984. \Federal Spending in Congressional Districts."
Western Political Quarterly 37: 404-423.
Persson, Torsten and, Guido Tabellini. 2004. \Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy
Outcomes." American Economic Review 94: 25-46.
Rakove, Milton. 1975. Don't Make No Waves, Don't Back No Losers. Bloomington, IN:
Indiana University Press.
Ritt, Leonard G. 1976. \Committee Position, Seniority, and the Distribution of Govern-
ment Expenditures." Public Policy 24: 469-497.
Sim, Feng-ji. 2002. \Mobilizing the Masses: Party Strategy with Political Mobilization."
Unpublished SM Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Snyder, James M., Jr. 1989. \Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources,"
Econometrica 57: 637-660.
Stromberg, David. 2004. \Radios Impact on Public Spending." Quarterly Journal of
Economics 119 (February): 189-221.
Stromberg, David. 2005. \How the Electoral College Inuences Campaigns and Policy:
The Probability of Being Florida." Working Paper, Institute for International Eco-
nomic Studies, Stockholm University.
Sundquist, James L. 1983. Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of
Political Parties in the United States. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute.
Wallis, John J. 1987. \Employment, Politics and Economic Recovery during the Great
Depression." Review of Economics and Statistics 69: 516-20.
Wallis, John J. 1996. \What Determines the Allocation of National Government Grants
to the States?" NBER Historical Paper No. 90.
Weingast, Barry R., Kenneth A. Shepsle and Christopher Johnsen. 1981. \The Political
Economy of Benets and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics."
Journal of Political Economy 89: 642{664.
Wright, Gavin. 1974. \The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric
Analysis." Review of Economics and Statistics. 56: 30-38.
25
Table 1: Simulation Results
Case 1: P = P = 0, I = 1:0,  = :7,  = :3
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 3 Model 4
I C a^I a^C a^I a^C a^I a^C a^P a^I a^C a^P
0.0 0.0 -.00 .09 .01 .09 .01 .09 .28 -.00 .09 .28
0.0 0.5 { .40 .06 .41 .05 .40 .24 .11 .39 .24
0.0 1.0 { .55 .09 .58 .07 .57 .20 .26 .56 .20
0.5 0.0 .42 { .43 .18 .43 .18 .30 .49 .08 .30
0.5 0.5 { { .40 .61 .40 .60 .27 .54 .44 .27
0.5 1.0 { { .32 .87 .31 .86 .23 .63 .71 .23
1.0 0.0 .49 { .56 .44 .57 .43 .31 .99 .07 .31
1.0 0.5 { { .53 .90 .53 .89 .29 1.00 .48 .28
1.0 1.0 { { .41 1.17 .40 1.15 .25 1.05 .81 .24
Case 2: P = P = 0, I = 1:0,  = :1,  = :3
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 3 Model 4
I C a^I a^C a^I a^C a^I a^C a^P a^I a^C a^P
0.0 0.0 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .01
0.0 0.5 { .27 .07 .30 .07 .29 .00 .15 .28 .00
0.0 1.0 { .24 .11 .27 .09 .28 .00 .32 .28 .00
0.5 0.0 .15 { .21 .15 .21 .14 .01 .50 .00 .00
0.5 0.5 { { .24 .52 .23 .51 .00 .57 .36 .00
0.5 1.0 { { .23 .70 .22 .69 .00 .69 .58 .00
1.0 0.0 -.61 { -.64 -.08 -.64 -.08 .00 1.00 .00 .01
1.0 0.5 { { -.53 .25 -.54 .24 .01 1.01 .41 .00
1.0 1.0 { { -.34 .61 -.37 .58 .02 1.08 .70 .01
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Table 1: Simulation Results (continued)
Case 3: P = P = :5, I = 1:0,  = :7,  = :3
Model 2b Model 2c Model 3 Model 4
I C a^I a^P a^C a^P a^I a^C a^P a^I a^C a^P
0.0 0.0 -.00 .84 .05 .84 -.00 .06 .85 .00 .06 .85
0.0 0.5 { { .38 .78 .10 .40 .78 .13 .38 .78
0.0 1.0 { { .60 .70 .13 .65 .70 .28 .62 .70
0.5 0.0 .39 .89 { { .39 .04 .90 .50 .05 .90
0.5 0.5 { { { { .43 .56 .85 .58 .41 .85
0.5 1.0 { { { { .36 .89 .78 .69 .71 .78
1.0 0.0 .28 .92 { { .27 .12 .93 1.00 .04 .93
1.0 0.5 { { { { .29 .65 .89 1.05 .45 .89
1.0 1.0 { { { { .12 .92 .84 1.12 .78 .84
Case 4: P = P = :5, I = 1:0,  = :1,  = :3
Model 2b Model 2c Model 3 Model 4
I C a^I a^P a^C a^P a^I a^C a^P a^I a^C a^P
0.0 0.0 -.00 .60 .00 .60 .00 .00 .60 -.00 .00 .60
0.0 0.5 { { .30 .54 .07 .32 .54 .17 .31 .54
0.0 1.0 { { .43 .45 .02 .44 .45 .38 .47 .45
0.5 0.0 -.14 .66 { { -.19 -.08 .66 .50 .00 .66
0.5 0.5 { { { { -.36 .12 .61 .60 .37 .61
0.5 1.0 { { { { -.68 .19 .55 .75 .61 .54
1.0 0.0 -.81 .70 { { -.89 -.21 .70 1.00 .00 .70
1.0 0.5 { { { { -1.17 -.20 .66 1.07 .40 .66
1.0 1.0 { { { { -1.59 -.23 .60 1.17 .71 .61
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Fig.1: Democratic vote share and partisanship by state
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Fig.2: Republican vote share and partisanship by state
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Fig3. Aggregate Democratic Vote and Partisanship over Time
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Fig.4: Standard dev. of Democratic vote and partisanship by State
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TABLE 2: Summary of Spending Regression Results
Model model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6
Coefficients β β γ γ δ δ
Dep. Variable Time Unit State F.E.
fed. exp. year no 0.34 0.54 -0.86* -0.49* -0.09 0.46*
fed. exp. year yes -0.35 -1.3** 0.19 0.1 0.37** 0.11
fed. exp. term no 0.24 0.73 -0.85 -0.7** -0.02 0.83**
fed. exp. term yes 0.15 -1.29** 0.2 -0.01 0.41** 0.33*
targetable year no 0.42 0.27 -0.68 -0.35 -0.26 0.16
targetable year yes -0.38 -0.88 0.11 0.06 0.2 -0.03
targetable term no 0.28 0.44 -0.63 -0.54* -0.11 0.56**
targetable term yes -0.31 -0.93 0.2 0.00 0.18 0.08
grants year no 0.11 -0.11 -0.16 -0.01 -0.04 0.05
grants year yes 0.08 0.01 0.03 -0.09* 0.06 0.1**
grants term no 0.13 0.05 -0.17 -0.09 -0.05 0.09
grants term yes 0.22 0.1 -0.00 -0.13** 0.05 0.11**
Model model 7 model 8
Coefficients β γ δ β γ δ
Dep Variable Time Unit State F.E.
fed. exp. year no 0.45 -0.86* 0.19 0.38 -0.52 -0.11
fed. exp. year yes -0.10 0.18 0.35* -1.46** 0.37 0.58**
fed. exp. term no 0.40 -0.85 0.25 0.28 -0.59 0.26
fed. exp. term yes 0.39 0.22 0.46** -1.40** 0.17 0.57**
targetable year no 0.42 -0.68 0.01 0.27 -0.63 -0.44
targetable year yes -0.26 0.1 0.16 0.92 0.21 0.17
targetable term no 0.33 -0.63 0.08 0.1 -0.51 0.08
targetable term yes -0.21 0.21 0.17 -0.99 0.00 0.15
grants year no 0.13 -0.16 0.03 -0.14 -0.00 0.05
grants year yes 0.14 0.04 0.08 -0.04 -0.07 0.03
grants term no 0.15 -0.17 0.03 -0.01 -0.08 0.02
grants term yes 0.26 0.00 0.07 0.01 -0.12 0.01
Each cell corresponds to a regression, of which only the relevant coefficient is reported. Detailed 
results can be found in the Statistical Appendix. Indicating with I the share of independents, with σ the 
standard deviation of Democratic vote, with CP and CV the closeness between the two main parties 
measured, respectively, using poll and voting data and with PP and PV the share of partisan supporters
 for the incumbent president measured, respectively, with poll and voting data, the more general models 
are specified as follows:
model 7: Xst = α+ηs + λt + βIst + γCPst + δPPst+ θZst +est
model 8: Xst = α+ηs + λt + βσst + γCVst + δPVst+ θZst +est
where X is expenditure (federal expenditure, targetable spending or grants), Z are control variables (real
income per capita, share of population aged 5-17, share of elderly, total population), s stands for state 
and t for the time unit (year or presidential term). Model 1 and model 2 set γ=δ=0 and use, respectively, 
I and σ. Models 3 and 4 set β=δ=0 and use, respectively, CP and CV. Models 5 and 6 set β=γ=0 and 
use, respectively, PP and PV. All regressions are repeated both with and without ηs (as indicated).
 When fixed effects are not used we introduce control dummies for Maryland, Virginia and New Mexico. 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses (clustered by state). * indicates significance at 10% level,
 ** at 5% and *** at 1%. 
TAB 3: Effects of spending on voting decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: vote for the governor president senator Congress
incumbent in columns 1-3 and vote
Democratic in column 4
( 1 )
federal expenditure 0.2851 -0.1295 -0.3230 -0.0507
(0.92) (1.80)* (1.20) (0.97)
partisan match 2.2109 2.0522 1.9842
(23.23)*** (55.71)*** (28.51)***
ideology match 0.9000 0.7427 0.6730
(15.41)*** (33.98)*** (10.97)***
fed. exp. x democratic share of house -0.0033
representatives (0.05)
share of Democratic 0.0803
representatives in the House (0.33)
Observations 121570 129429 181350 190944
Pseudo-R2 0.4523 0.3646 0.3559 0.3407
( 2 )
targetable spending 1.2421 -0.1393 -0.3303 0.0168
(1.80)* (1.92)* (1.08) (0.25)
partisan match 2.1195 2.2128 1.9677
(22.73)*** (52.27)*** (28.11)***
ideology match 0.8779 0.7303 0.6671
(14.24)*** (36.78)*** (10.89)***
targetable spend. x democratic share -0.0251
of house representatives (0.30)
share of Democratic 0.1372
representatives in the House (0.49)
Observations 109711 141451 175323 174387
Pseudo-R2 0.4648 0.3657 0.3514 0.3283
( 3 )
grants 0.1538 0.3718 0.9469 0.5154
(0.09) (0.59) (0.89) (2.08)**
partisan match 2.2035 2.0505 1.9885
(22.85)*** (55.81)*** (28.46)***
ideology match 0.8998 0.7309 0.6737
(14.75)*** (36.53)*** (10.91)***
grants x democratic share 0.1688
of house representatives (0.78)
share of Democratic -0.0123
representatives in the House (0.09)
Observations 121570 141451 181350 190944
Pseudo-R2 0.4518 0.3646 0.3555  0.3408
All regressions include a constant, year dummies, state fixed effects and the following control variables: income per capita,
percentage of the population in schooling age, percentage of the population above the age of 65, total population. The House
regressions also include dummies for Democratic partisanship, Republican partisanship, liberal ideology and conservative
ideology. Partisan match is a dummy equal to 1 if the voter has the same partisanship of the incumbent politician. Ideology
match is a dummy equal to 1 if the voter is liberal and the incumbent politician is a Democrat, or if the voter is conservative and the 
incumbent is Republican. Robust z-statistics in parentheses (clustered by state). * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%.
Table 4: Variable Denition and Sources
 Exit Poll data. We use questions on reported vote, party identication and ideol-
ogy. Party identication question are typically of the form: \Regardless of how you
voted today, do you normally think of yourself as a [Democrat], [Republican], [Inde-
pendent], [Something Else]?"; ideology questions are typically of the form: \regardless
of the party you may favor, do you lean more toward the liberal side or the conserv-
ative side politically [liberal], [conservative], [somewhere in between]?". The share of
Democratic (Republican, Independent) is then constructed by aggregating individual
observations by state. We have proceeded analogously for the ideology data. This
information is available every two years but aggregated over four year periods to avoid
small samples in some states. Only samples of at least 100 hundred observations
have been used. Very few cases have been deleted using this method. All regressions
have been repeated not excluding these cases and they deliver the same results. Once
obtained the 4-years aggregates, data have been smoothed assuming that variations
in ideology and partisanship are gradual (and keeping xed the years of presidential
elections). For example, D1985 = 0:25D1984 + 0:75D1988; D1986 = 0:5D1984 + 0:5D1988;
D1987 = 0:25D1984+0:75D1988: The data obtained with this procedure have been nally
lagged by one period. The share of swing voters is measured by the share of indepen-
dents. Closeness is measured as 1 jD Rj: Partisanship fo the incumbent president is.
D when the president is democratic and R when the president is republican. Sources:
CBS News, New York Times, ABC News, Washington Post, Voters News Service.
 Spending data. Federal Expenditure, Targetable Expenditure (dened as Federal
Expenditure-Direct Payments to Individuals), Grants are all in real and per capita
terms. Targetable spending is total federal expenditure minus direct payments to
individuals. Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States.
 Voting Data. Dening as fD the share of Democratic vote in the last election and eR
the share of Republican vote in the last election, we always consider D = fD=(fD + eR)
and R = 1 D. Swingness is measured as the standard deviation of D in the previous
three presidential elections. Election closeness is dened as 1  jD  Rj. The share of
vote for the incumbent president is D when the president is democratic and R when
the president is republican. Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States.
 Socioeconomic data. Real Income per capita, Population (in logarithms), Percent-
age Elderly (above 65), and Percentage in Schooling Age (5-17), are taken from the
Statistical Abstract of the United States.
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